























































































































































































































































































We estimate a forward looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) for the U.S. using data from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters as proxy for expected inﬂation. We obtain signiﬁcant and
plausible estimates for the structural parameters of the NKPC (the discount factor and the share of
ﬁrms adjusting prices) independent from whether output or unit labor costs are used as a measure of
marginal costs. Survey expectations suggest that the usual identiﬁcation of expectations exploiting
orthogonality of forecast errors with respect to output is severely distorted, which explains why the
NKPC estimated with survey data performs much better than under the assumption of rational
expectations. We also ﬁnd that lagged inﬂation enters the price equation signiﬁcantly, even when
controlling for its ability to predict expectations. This suggests a role for lagged inﬂation beyond
that of capturing non-rationalities in expectations. When estimating a Phillips curve where lagged
inﬂation enters due to price indexation by non-reoptimizing ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that rejection of the
coe!cient restrictions depends on the measure of marginal costs used.






Recent papers have shown a revived interest in the ability of models with nominal price
rigidities to explain the dynamics of inflation rates. Among the different models under
scrutiny, forward looking New Keynesian models have become popular amongst researchers
and policy makers. These models generate a so-called New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
that relates inflation rates to expected future inflation rates and the marginal costs of
production.
This paper estimates a forward looking NKPC for the United States. The main novelty of
the paper is that expected future inflation rates are measured using inflation survey data from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Testing sticky price models with survey expectations is attractive since, to the extent that
survey data correctly capture agents’ expectations, it allows to disregard issues related to the
specification of agents’ expectations functions. One neither has to impose untested
orthogonality restrictions, as required when estimating under the assumption of rational
expectations, nor has to make restrictive assumptions about the precise form of non-rationality
present in agents’ forecasts. This allows to focus on the question whether the economic model
under consideration is correctly specified.
Previous tests of the NKPC have generated mixed results when performed under the
assumption that agents hold rational inflation expectations. More precisely, the empirical
success depended crucially on whether marginal production costs have been approximated by
the output gap or by unit labor costs.
Our main finding is that the NKPC performs equally well with both measures of
marginal costs, output and unit labor costs. Whatever measure is used, the estimate of the
quarterly discount factor is close to one and the point estimate of the degree of price stickiness
implies that firms reset their prices every four to five quarters on average.
These results suggests that potential non-rationalities in expectations, as they show up in
surveys, have biased rational expectations estimates that used the output gap to approximate
marginal costs. Quite surprisingly, the same non-rationalities do not seem to play a role when
using unit labor costs.
We show that the reason for this finding is that approximating the agents’ information set
using the unit labor cost variable rests on more solid grounds than approximating it using the
output variable. In particular, the survey data suggest that the hypothesis of rational
expectations implies a too high correlation between lagged output and future inflation
expectations. We show that this causes the coefficient estimate for the output gap to become
negative, contrary to what is implied by theory.
This indicates that sticky price models are able to establish a close link between output
dynamics and the behavior of inflation once potential non-rationalities in expectations are




To check for the robustness of our findings, we include into the price equation lags of
various variables and test for their significance. While lagged measures of marginal costs
(unit labor costs and output) and lagged expectations remain insignificant, lagged inflation
enters significantly. Moreover, lagged inflation remains significant even when we account for
the fact that agents might use this variable to inform their inflation forecasts.
The significance of lagged inflation suggests that this variable plays a role in explaining
inflation dynamics that goes beyond explaining how actual inflation expectations might
deviate from rationality, contrary to what seems to be the predominant interpretation in the
recent literature.
To account for the role of lagged inflation we then estimate an inflation-indexation model
where lagged inflation enters because firms that do not optimally adjust prices are assumed to
index their prices using lagged inflation. We find that the data support the sign restrictions
implied by the model. Also, the more detailed parameter restrictions are not rejected when
output is used as the measure of marginal costs. However, these tend to be rejected with unit
labor costs.
Although the evidence is generally supportive of the NKPC, lagged inflation seems to be
a significant determinant of current inflation, even when taking care of potential non-
rationalities in inflation expectations. This fact cannot be reconciled with the standard New




1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyzes the ability of sticky price models to explain the dynamics of U.S. inﬂation when
using survey data as proxies for inﬂation expectations.
Testing sticky price models with survey expectations is attractive since, to the extent that survey
data correctly capture agents’ expectations, they allow to disregard issues related to the speciﬁcation
of agents’ expectations functions. One neither has to impose untested orthogonality restrictions, as
required when estimating under the assumption of rational expectations, nor has to make restrictive
assumptions about the precise form of non-rationality present in agents’ forecast functions. This
allows to focus on the question whether the economic models under consideration are correctly
speciﬁed.
Previous tests of sticky price models performed under the assumption that agents hold rational
expectations have generated mixed results. Prominently, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) have reported
that sticky price models do not generate su!cient stickiness for inﬂation when the output gap is
used as a measure of real marginal costs.
Recent evidence, however, has shown that the empirical performance depends crucially on how
one measures real marginal costs, the main determinant of inﬂation according to sticky price models.
For instance, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) show that sticky price models perform
well once marginal costs are approximated by average unit labor costs.1
It makes an important dierence whether sticky price models successfully explain inﬂation dy-
namics as a function of output behavior or whether they relate inﬂation dynamics to the behavior
of unit labor costs. Given that the ultimate objective is a model explaining the joint behavior of
output and inﬂation, the latter case would require an additional empirically plausible theory linking
the dynamics of unit labor costs to the behavior of output.
The present paper studies whether the currently popular New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC),
which can be derived from Calvo (1983) style sticky price models, is able to explain a relationship
between inﬂation on the one hand and output or unit labor costs on the other hand. Thus, we
let the data speak whether a theory linking output to costs is warranted, once expectations are
approximated by data reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Our main ﬁnding is that the NKPC performs equally well with both measures of marginal costs,
output and unit labor costs. Whatever measure is used, the estimate of the quarterly discount factor
is close to one and the point estimate of the degree of price stickiness implies that ﬁrms reset their
prices every four to ﬁve quarters on average.
These results suggests that potential non-rationalities in expectations, as they show up in surveys,
have biased previous estimates using output as a measure for marginal costs. Quite surprisingly, the
same non-rationalities do not seem to play a role when using unit labor costs. Here our estimates
1Ad i erent view about the ability of unit labor costs to explain U.S. inﬂation dynamics has recently been expressed




conﬁrm the results obtained by Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) who assumed rational
expectations.
We show that the reason for this ﬁnding is that approximating the agents’ information set using
the unit labor cost variable rests on more solid grounds than approximating it using the output
variable. In particular, the survey data suggests that the hypothesis of rational expectations implies
a too high correlation between lagged output and future inﬂation expectations. We show that this
causes the coe!cient estimate for output to become negative, contrary to what is implied by theory.
These results suggest that once one takes account of potentially non-rational expectations via
survey expectations, sticky price models are able to establish a close link between output dynamics
and the behavior of inﬂation.
To check for the robustness of this ﬁnding, we include into the price equation lags of various
variables and test for their signiﬁcance. While lagged measures of marginal costs (unit labor costs and
output) and lagged expectations remain insigniﬁcant, lagged inﬂation enters signiﬁcantly. Moreover,
lagged inﬂation remains signiﬁcant even when we account for the fact that agents might use this
variable to inform their inﬂation forecasts.
The signiﬁcance of lagged inﬂation suggests that this variable plays a role in explaining inﬂa-
tion dynamics that goes beyond explaining how actual inﬂation expectations might deviate from
rationality, contrary to what seems to be the predominant interpretation in the recent literature.
To account for the role of lagged inﬂation we estimated the inﬂation-indexation model of Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) where lagged inﬂation enters because ﬁrms are assumed to
index their prices using lagged inﬂation rates in periods where they do not adjust prices optimally.
We ﬁnd that the data support the sign restrictions implied by the model. The more detailed pa-
rameter restrictions implied by this model are not rejected when output is used as the measure of
marginal costs but tend to be rejected for the case of unit labor costs. Somewhat surprisingly, the
share of reoptimizing ﬁrms is still estimated to be around one quarter for most speciﬁcations.2
Obviously, we are not the ﬁrst to estimate sticky price models using survey expectations. Roberts
(1995, 1997) estimated sticky price models using the Livingston and Michigan surveys and showed
that sticky price models can account for inﬂation dynamics at a semi-annual or annual frequency.
Since data in the Survey of Professional Forecasters is collected on a quarterly basis we can construct
a quarterly model. Our estimates thereby remain more easily comparable to recent estimates based
on quarterly data.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present conditions under which the ﬁrst
order conditions characterizing ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decision give rise to a New Keynesian Phillips
Curve when expectations are potentially non-rational. Section 3 presents the data and assesses the
rationality of survey expectations. The estimation results for the benchmark NKPC are presented
in section 4 and their robustness is analyzed in section 5. Section 6 then presents the results for the
inﬂation indexation model and a conclusion brieﬂy summarizes.





2 Monopolistic Price-Setting with Subjective Expectations
This section derives the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for the case where expectations are subjective
and potentially non-rational. The resulting Phillips curve will be similar to widely used speciﬁcations
of Galí and Gertler (1999) and Roberts (1995). For illustrative purposes we use Calvo’s (1983) time-
dependent pricing model to derive our results but similar reduced-form Phillips curve equations can
be obtained using the quadratic adjustment cost model of Rotemberg (1982).
Firms in monopolistic competition must precommit to prices that can be reset with probability
1 5 (0,1) each period. Firms’ forecasts are produced by professional forecasters. Each forecaster
i 5 {1,...I} thereby advises a ﬁxed share 1
I of ﬁrms. The (subjective) forecast delivered by forecaster
i will be denoted by Fi
t [·].
Let Pt denote the aggregate price level at period t and Pi
t the price chosen by a ﬁrm that can
reset prices in period t and is advised by forecaster i. Then the new price level can be expressed as







t + Pt1 (1)
The new price level is a convex combination between the old price level and the average price
selected by ﬁrms that adjust their price. Firms that reset prices maximize expected discounted
























where   1 is the discount factor, % > 1 is the elasticity of the demand function, and MC are the
nominal marginal costs of production. Linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions of this problem around
a zero inﬂation steady state delivers
p
,i









where lower case variables denote percentage deviations from steady state. Under the assumption
of rational expectations equations (1) and (3) can be used to derive the familiar New Keynesian
Phillips Curve
t = Et [t+1]+
(1  )(1  )

rmct (4)
where current inﬂation is a function of (rational) inﬂation expectations and real marginal costs rmct.
Deriving an equation similar to equation (4) when expectations are subjective is not entirely
obvious. Proﬁt-maximizing prices depend on nominal costs and therefore on forecasted inﬂation.
Inﬂation is determined by other agents’ pricing decisions and their marginal cost forecasts. As a




see Woodford (2001) for a recent treatment. Obviously, expectations survey data do not report
agents’ subjective forecasts of other agents’ forecasts. Therefore, we want to delineate conditions
under which subjective inﬂation forecasts summarize all beliefs about other agents’ marginal cost
expectations.






t+1 [mct+s]  Fh
t [mct+s]
¤
=0 ;i,h,s > 0 (5)
Condition 1 requires that agents do not expect that current forecasts of future variables will be
revised in a particular direction in the next period, i.e. they do not expect predictable movements
of their own or other agents’ expectations. This is the case whenever expectations fulﬁll the ’law of
iterated expectations’.
Importantly, condition 1 does not rule out non-rationalities in expectations. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that marginal costs are expected to follow an AR(1) process where multi-step forecasts are
obtained by simply iterating the AR(1) equation. Condition 1 is then satisﬁed but expectations will
be non-rational if actual inﬂation follows some other stochastic process.
Appendix 8.1 shows that whenever condition 1 holds, the subjective inﬂation forecast of the
aggregate inﬂation rate is a su!cient statistic summarizing all forecasts of other agents’ forecasts.
One then obtains a Phillips curve of the form:
t = Ft [t+1]+
(1  )(1  )

rmct (6)
The only dierence to the Phillips curve in equation (4) is that rational expectations are now









This section describes the data we use to estimate equation (6). A detailed description of the data
sources and variable deﬁnitions is given in appendix 8.2.
We use quarterly U.S. data from 1968:4-2000:1 where the starting date is determined by the
availability of inﬂation survey data. Inﬂation is calculated using the implicit GDP deﬂator.3 We use
aggregate data instead of data for the non-farm private business sector, which is the usual activity
measure used in the literature, because inﬂation forecasts are available only for aggregate deﬂators.
Since non-farm private business accounts for approximately 85% of aggregate GDP our results can
be expected to be comparable to the remaining literature. In any case, the broader activity measure
should only strengthen the importance of our ﬁndings.




We use two measures for the real marginal costs in equation (6). Firstly, we use the unit labor
costs, deﬁned as the dierence between log compensation to employees and log nominal GDP in
deviation from the sample average. This is the measure used by Galí and Gertler (1999) or Sbordone
(2002).4 Secondly, we consider the output gap, obtained by detrending output with an HP-ﬁlter
with smoothing parameter 1600.5 The output gap has been used by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), for
example.
Figure 2 graphs the unit labor costs and the output gap. The ﬁgure shows that there is a negative
contemporaneous correlation between the labor share and output, as was the case for the data used
by Galí and Gertler (1999).
Inﬂation expectations are approximated with data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
The survey collects data from around 80 professional forecasters on a quarterly basis from 1968
onwards. A description of the survey can be found in Croushore (1993). Given that we estimate a
quarterly model, we use the mean of the one-quarter ahead inﬂation forecast for the implicit GDP
deﬂator as the measure for expected inﬂation in equation (6).
Figure 1 plots actual and expected quarterly inﬂation rates and shows that actual and expected
inﬂation rates move closely together over the sample period.6
To assess whether inﬂation forecasts are biased or ine!cient we perform a standard test. This
test requires to regress actual inﬂation rates on a constant and on expected inﬂation rates and to
check if the constant is equal to zero and the coe!cient in front of the expectations term equal to






Since the coe!cient restrictions are not rejected, survey expectations seem to be consistent with
rational expectations.
A closer look at ﬁgure 1, however, suggests that expected inﬂation is lagging actual inﬂation
slightly. Indeed, it is not di!cult to ﬁnd evidence that the survey expectations are ine!cient. In
particular, the constant appearing in equation (8) is not equal to zero in various sub-periods. This
is shown in table 1, which presents results from regressing forecast errors on a constant and dummy
variables for the 1970’s and 1980’s, where the latter intend to capture dierent policy regimes.
The estimates in table 1 show that inﬂation expectations have been signiﬁcantly below actual
inﬂation rates during the 1970’s and considerably above the actual rates during the 1980’s. This
seems hardly surprising given that inﬂation rates were generally rising during the 1970’s but falling
during the 1980’s and indicates that forecasts are far from being e!cient (see also Croushore (1996)).
Table 2 presents further evidence on the time series structure of forecast errors. Column two of
the table shows that forecast errors display signiﬁcant positive autocorrelation. Correlation decreases
only moderately when accounting for dierent policy regimes via time dummies in the third column.
4These authors use data for the non-farm private business sector only.
5We also used quadratic detrending, which led to very similar results.
6At each date the ﬁgure shows actual quarterly inﬂation and the forecast made for this rate in the previous quarter.




To the extent that survey expectations correctly capture inﬂation expectations the previous
evidence shows that these expectations are ine!cient and, thus, can be biased during sub-periods.
This suggests that forecast errors will generally not be orthogonal to information available to agents
at the time of the forecast. This is important because instrumental variable techniques, which are
commonly employed to estimate the NKPC under rational expectations, assume orthogonality of
forecast errors with respect to lagged information.
To check whether commonly used instruments are correlated with the forecast errors implied by
the survey data, we regressed these errors on a constant and lags of output, inﬂation, unit labor
costs, commodity price inﬂation, and all variables together. The upper panel of table 3 reports
F-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the coe!cients on lags 1 to 4 of these regressors are
jointly equal to zero. The hypothesis is strongly rejected in all cases. In the lower panel of table 3
we report the same test when regressing on lags 2 to 4 only, to check whether results are sensitive to
the assumption that agents know the ﬁrst lag of the considered variables. Results remain unchanged.
To the extent that survey data correctly capture agents’ inﬂation expectations, these results cast
doubts on the validity of Phillips curve estimates that have been derived under the assumption of
rational expectations.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents the results from estimating equation (6) with the data set described in the
previous section.
If theory was correct and all variables were measured without error, then equation (6) would
perfectly ﬁt the data. Obviously, this is highly implausible for a number of reasons. The time
dependent pricing setting rules underlying equation (6) are at best an approximation to ﬁrms actual
price setting behavior. Moreover, the variables entering equation (6) are not precisely measured by
our data; this might hold for the GDP Deﬂator as well as for the two measures of real marginal cost.
We proceed by assuming that deviations from equation (6) are due to measurement error. Con-
sequently, we estimate
t = Ft [t+1]+rmct + %t (9)
where %t captures measurement errors and where
 =
(1  )(1  )

Measurement errors might aect the left-hand and right-hand side of equation (9). Errors af-
fecting the left-hand side are of little concern since OLS estimators can deal with it. Measurement
errors on the right-hand side, however, would require the use of instrumental variable (IV) estima-
tors. Right-hand side errors could arise because we replaced the mean expected inﬂation by the




the consistency of OLS estimates cannot be rejected for our sample, as shown in section 5, we will
report OLS estimates of equation (9) below.8
Table 4 shows the estimates of equation (9) when using the unit labor costs (column 2) and
the output gap (column 4), respectively, as a measure for marginal costs.9 Independent from the
speciﬁcation of marginal costs, all coe!cients have the correct sign and are signiﬁcant at the one
percent level. In particular, the discount rate is close to one, as theory would predict, and the
estimate of  is positive.
The value for the degree of price stickiness  implied by the point estimates for  and  is also
reported in the table. Independent from the marginal cost measure, the estimates suggests that
about one forth of ﬁrms adjust prices every quarter, which causes prices to be reset once a year on
average. This seems largely consistent with survey data on price stickiness, see Blinder et al. (1998).
For completeness, columns three and ﬁve of table 4 report the results from restricting the discount
factor to be equal to one, as commonly done in the empirical literature. This does not cause a sizeable
change of the implied stickiness parameter .
The results for the case that real marginal costs are approximated by unit labor costs are in
line with estimates obtained by Galí and Gertler (1999) who assumed inﬂation expectations to
be rational.10 This is surprising since, as shown in table 3, the forecast errors implied by survey
expectations are not orthogonal to lagged unit labor costs, which is an identiﬁcation assumption made
by these authors. This suggests that the distortion caused by such an identiﬁcation assumption is
not strong enough to seriously aect the parameter estimates. We will come back to this point
below.
Even more surprising are the results reported for the output gap in table 4. It has been rather
di!cult to obtain parameter estimates with the correct sign and of a plausible magnitude when using
output as a measure for marginal costs. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Galí and Gertler (1999), for
example, ﬁnd a negative and insigniﬁcant estimate of  when real marginal costs are approximated
by detrended output. Table 4, however, shows that with the help of survey expectations one can
establish a plausible link between output and inﬂation dynamics via the NKPC. This suggests that
the assumption of rational expectations is not innocuous in this case.
Why do non-rationalities seem to matter when using output but not when using labor costs as
a measure for marginal costs? A detailed answer is given below.
For the case of unit labor costs, the correlation between next period’s actual inﬂation and
marginal costs is of about the same size as the correlation between the subjective expectation of
8We also prefer OLS estimates to IV estimates because they avoid the problem of instrument choice to which IV
estimates may be sensitive.
9Since Bartlett tests reject the null hypothesis that the residuals follow a white noise we use the Newey-West
correction with four lags to compute the standard errors for the regression.
10Our point estimate for the degree of price stickiness is somewhat lower and the point estimate of the discount




next period’s inﬂation and marginal costs. This suggests that inﬂation expectations incorporate
large part of the information contained in current unit labor costs.11
The situation is quite dierent for the case of the output gap. There, the correlation between next
period’s actual inﬂation and current output is much higher than the correlation between expected
inﬂation and output. Thus, identifying restrictions that impose orthogonality of forecast errors with
respect to current output impute too much information to expectations.
To see how a change in these correlations might induce a change in the sign of the estimated





corr(t,rmc t)  corr(Ft [t+1],rmc t) · B
¢
(10)
where A is the determinant of a positive deﬁnite matrix and therefore always positive and B =
corr(Ft [t+1],t) is approximately equal to 0.8 and independent from whether subjective expec-
tations or actual future inﬂation rates are used as a proxy for expected inﬂation.12 Given this, the
sign of  depends mainly on the dierence between corr(t,rmc t) and corr(Ft [t+1],rmc t).
Actual inﬂation is more strongly correlated with lagged output than with contemporaneous
output. This is shown in ﬁgure 4, which depicts the correlations together with the 95% conﬁdence
intervals.13 Thus, the estimated coe!cient is negative (or insigniﬁcant) when output is used as a
measure for real marginal costs and when actual inﬂation is the measure for expected inﬂation.14
When substituting actual inﬂation by subjective expectations the coe!cient turns positive again
because the correlation between subjective inﬂation expectations and the output gap is much lower
than the same correlation for actual inﬂation. This explains the changed sign for the  coe!cient.
When unit labor costs are used then the dierence in the correlation coe!cients is positive and
almost independent from the measure of expected inﬂation (actual inﬂation or subjective forecasts).
While corr(Ft [t+1],rmc t) is smaller than corr(t,rmc t) when expectations are subjective, as
one would expect, the same holds when expectations are rational. Figure 3 depicts the dynamic
correlation between actual inﬂation and unit labor costs together with the 95% conﬁdence intervals.15
The ﬁgure shows that both variables are contemporaneously correlated. Consequently, the coe!cient
estimate remains positive when assuming rational expectations.
The previous results show that the NKPC can link inﬂation dynamics to both output and unit
labor cost dynamics once survey data are used to proxy for inﬂation expectations. At the same time,
survey data suggest that the identiﬁcation of expectations assuming orthogonality with respect to
11The fact that corr(t+1,mc t) E corr(Ft[t+1],mc t) implies that in a regression of the forecast error (t+1 3
Ft[t+1]) on a constant and marginal costs mct the coe!cient in front of mct is (approximately) equal to zero. Thus,
mct cannot explain the forecast errors. Obviously, this does not imply that forecasts contain the information in lagged
values of mct. Table 3 shows that this is not the case.
12corr(·,·) denotes the correlation coe!cient between two variables.
13Conﬁdence intervals have been computed using bootstrapped standard errors.
14Taking actual inﬂation is similar to assuming that expectations are rational. It is identical when shocks are absent,
i.e. in a perfect foresight equilibrium.




output is responsible for the unsatisfactory performance of the NKPC when using output as a
measure for marginal costs.
5 Robustness of the Results
5.1 Consistency of OLS Estimates
Since measurement error may be present on the right-hand side of equation (9) we tested for the
consistency of our OLS estimates. This can be done using the Hausman test which compares
instrumental variable estimates with OLS estimates. The null hypothesis under scrutiny is that
OLS generate consistent estimates of the parameters in equation (9).
We computed the Hausman test for both measures of real marginal costs. Since the qualitative
results are identical we report only those obtained for unit labor costs.
The set of instruments used includes two lags of expected inﬂation and four lags of marginal
costs.16 The instruments pass the Hansen-Sargan test with a statistic equal to 8.7630 which cor-
responds to a p-value of 0.1189. F-tests strongly reject the hypothesis that the coe!cients in the
regressions of expected inﬂation and marginal costs on the instruments are jointly equal to zero.17
The R2 of these regressions are 0.9301 and 0.8694 for expected inﬂation and marginal costs, respec-
tively. This shows that the chosen instruments do not violate overidentifying restrictions and are
correlated with the variables in the regression.
Estimating equation (9) with the chosen instruments and computing the Hausman statistic
implies a p-value of 0.5378 for the null hypothesis that OLS estimates are consistent. This justiﬁes
the use of OLS estimates in the previous section.
5.2 Sub-Sample Stability
In this section we analyze the stability of the Phillips curve relationship by considering the estimates
obtained from dierent sub-samples.
We split the sample into 3 approximately decade-long sub-periods: 1968:4-1979:4, 1980:1-1989:4,
and 1990:1-2000:1. Splitting the data set in this way generates sub-samples with rather dierent
inﬂation experiences. While inﬂation has been volatile and rising in the 1970’s, inﬂation dropped
during the 1980’s and has been low and stable during the 1990’s, see ﬁgure 1.
T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e s ed i erences have been caused by dierences in the conduct of monetary
policy, a test for parameter stability in the three sub-samples may be considered to be a test for
the policy invariance of the price-setting assumption underlying the Calvo (1983) formulation of the
NKPC.
16The use of lagged variables as instruments is legitimate if the measurement error has no structure (classical
measurement error).




Table 5 reports the coe!cient estimates for the three sub-samples. Reassuringly, all coe!cients
have the correct sign independent from the sample period and the measure of marginal costs used.
However, real marginal cost do not always enter signiﬁcantly in the 1980’s and do never so in the
1990’s. This lack of statistical insigniﬁcance may be partly due output and inﬂation not showing
very much sample variation, at least during the last sub-sample period.
The Chow test rejects the hypothesis of sub-sample stability across the three periods indepen-
dently from the measure of marginal cost used.18 For the speciﬁcation using output one cannot
reject that all sub-sample estimates of  are equal to the estimate obtained for the whole sample.
An analogous test for unit labor cost, however, rejects parameter constancy.
The estimates in table 5 also suggest that the discount factor has been higher during the 1970’s
than during the 1980’s and 1990’s.19 Giving an economic interpretation to this ﬁnding seems di!cult
in the light of the underlying theory.
Comparing the estimates for degree of price stickiness  in table 5 suggests that price rigidity has
been higher during the 1990’s than during the 1970’s. Thus, the underlying pricing rules seem not
to be invariant to the inﬂation process, as one might expect. The higher and more variable inﬂation
experience during the 1970’s might have caused ﬁrms to reset their prices more often than this was
the case during the 1990’s where inﬂation was low and stable.
Overall, the picture emerging from the sub-samples is not too disappointing. Despite some impor-
tant dierence across the dierent time periods, all estimates still have the correct sign. Moreover,
there is no evidence that the performance of the Phillips curve depends on the measure of marginal
costs used, which is the main ﬁnding obtained for the whole sample period.
5.3 The Role of Lagged Variables
We now assess to what extent the data attribute a role to lagged variables in explaining inﬂation
dynamics. This is done by adding lagged values of inﬂation, expected inﬂation, and marginal costs
to equation (9). We consider this ad-hoc variation as a robustness check to see whether the data
favor the Phillips curve of equation (9) or rather some alternative speciﬁcation.
Table 6 reports the estimation results. Except for lagged inﬂation, which enters signiﬁcantly in
both speciﬁcations, all other lagged variables remain insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. When adding
either lagged expectations or lagged marginal costs, the parameter estimates remain surprisingly
close to the benchmark estimates reported in table 4. In particular, the discount factor remains
close to one and the coe!cients on marginal costs still have the correct sign. Also the sum of the
coe!cients on marginal costs remains close to their benchmark values.
The case with lagged inﬂation diers notably. Typically, the role for lagged inﬂation in the pricing
equation is attributed to the presence of agents whose forecasts are not perfectly rational, see Galí
18The F-Statistics of the test are 23.17 and 19.66 for unit labor costs and output gaps, respectively.





and Gertler (1999) or Roberts (1997). In the current setting this interpretation is inappropriate
because we have accounted for potential non-rationalities in expectations through the use of survey
data. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that lagged inﬂation enters signiﬁcantly due to non-rationalities
only: since the survey expectations are likely to depend on lagged inﬂation rates, expected inﬂation
and lagged inﬂation tend to be collinear and the coe!cient on lagged inﬂation might capture variation
in lagged inﬂation that should be attributed to expected inﬂation.20
To assess whether lagged inﬂation has explanatory power for inﬂation dynamics beyond its abil-
ity to predict expected inﬂation we perform the following exercise: we regress lagged inﬂation on
expected inﬂation and include the regression residuals into the standard speciﬁcation (9) as an
additional regressor.
Intuitively, the regression residuals represent that part of the variation of lagged inﬂation which is
orthogonal to expected inﬂation and, thus, does not explain variations in expectations. It should be
clear that by including only these residuals into the pricing equation when testing for the signiﬁcance
of lagged inﬂation, we bias results in favor of rejecting a role for lagged inﬂation.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that the orthogonalized part of lagged inﬂation is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.21 This is independent from the marginal cost measure used, as shown in table 7. This ﬁnding
strongly suggests that there is a role for lagged inﬂation in explaining the inﬂation dynamics which
goes well beyond its role in explaining how inﬂation expectations deviate from rational expectations.
This point is addressed in the next section.
6 Extension: The Indexation Model
The previous section has shown that lagged inﬂation seems to be an important variable explaining
inﬂation dynamics beyond what can be explained by inﬂation expectations and marginal costs. Due
to this ﬁnding we consider the model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), which attributes
a role to lagged inﬂation because ﬁrms that do not re-optimize their prices are assumed to index
their prices using lagged inﬂation rates.
The analogue to equation (9) for this model is given by
t = 1t1 + 2Ft [t+1]+3rmct + %t (11)





(1+) ,a n dt1 is the lagged inﬂation rate.22 For  =1
the model is very similar to the relative contracting model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995), the only
dierence being that it does not contain a moving average of real marginal costs.
20Collinearity is conﬁrmed by corr(Ft[t+1],t31) E 0.883 and by the estimation results in table 6: 1. There is a
large change in the reported coe!cients on expected inﬂation caused by the introduction of lagged inﬂation; 2. The
sum of the coe!cients on expected and lagged inﬂation is almost identical to the coe!cients reported in table 4; 3.
The estimated standard errors increase substantially.
21Pagan (1984) shows that under the null hypothesis of no role for lagged inﬂation the estimator of the standard
error for the coe!cient of (orthogonalized) lagged inﬂation is consistent despite the fact that the regressor is generated.
The asymptotic t-Statistic is therefore valid.




The results from estimating equation (11) by OLS are reported in table 8.23 The second and ﬁfth
column show the unrestricted estimates using unit labor costs and output, respectively, as measures
for marginal costs. All coe!cients have the predicted sign and are signiﬁcant.
The structural parameters  and  can be retrieved using  =
2
1 together with the deﬁnition of
3. Their values are reported in the last two rows of the table. Due to the collinearity between lagged
inﬂation and expected future inﬂation, the estimates of the discount factor  are rather imprecise.
T h ei m p l i e dv a l u e sf o rt h ed e g r e eo fp r i c es t i c k i n e s s seem slightly higher than those reported in
table 4 but the dierence is not signiﬁcant.
For a discount factor close to one, model (11) implies 1 = 2. Columns three and six of table 8
report the results of estimating equation (11) when imposing this restriction. For both speciﬁcations
F-tests do not reject the equality of 1 and 2. This contrasts to the results reported by Galí and
Gertler (1999) who estimated equation (11) under the assumption of rational expectations.24 For all
speciﬁcations reported in table 2 of their paper, equality of the two coe!cients would be rejected.
This suggests that the indexation model performs somewhat better when survey expectations are
used as a proxy for agents’ inﬂation expectations.
The more stringent restriction 1 = 2 = 1
2, however, tends to be rejected when using unit labor
costs as the marginal cost measure, see column four of table 8, while it is not rejected for the case
of output, see column seven.
Overall, the estimated coe!cients of equation (11) have the correct sign and the restrictions
implied by theory tend not to be rejected. Although one may interpret this as cautious evidence
in favor of the indexation model, the performance depends on the measure of marginal costs used.
This leaves doubts on whether the indexation model is able to oer an appropriate explanation for
the role of lagged inﬂation.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we studied the ability of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve to explain the U.S. inﬂation
experience once the assumption of rational inﬂation expectations is relaxed.
The data gave considerable support for the parameter restrictions implied by the standard
forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve. In particular, the discount factor was found to
be close to one, inﬂation was positively aected by real marginal costs, and the degree of price
stickiness implied by the estimates suggested that about one forth of ﬁrms reset price every quarter.
These results were found to be independent from whether unit labor cost or detrended output were
used as a measure for real marginal costs.
Despite the generally supportive evidence, we showed that lagged inﬂation seems to be a sig-
niﬁcant determinant of inﬂation dynamics, even when taking care of potential non-rationalities in
23We also used IV estimation with two lags of expected inﬂation, and 4 lags of marginal costs as instruments. The
results are very similar to the ones reported in table 8.
24These authors gave a dierent economic interpretation to equation (11): lagged inﬂation was supposed to enter




inﬂation expectations through the use of survey expectations. The standard New Keynesian Phillips
Curve cannot account for this ﬁnding.
When estimating the indexation model suggested by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001),
which introduces an explicit role for lagged inﬂation, we ﬁnd that output data tends to support the
implied parameter restrictions while the speciﬁcation tends to be rejected when using unit labor
costs.
Although uncertainty remains about the role of lagged inﬂation, the results presented in this
paper show that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve oers an empirically plausible explanation of
inﬂation dynamics as a function of output dynamics or unit labor costs once inﬂation expectations




8A p p e n d i x
8.1 Subjective expectation and the NKPC
Here we show how one can derive the NKPC (6) with subjective expectations. Subtracting equation
(1) from the same equation shifted one period forward delivers
t+1 =( 1 )




















Applying the operator Ft (as deﬁned in equation (7)) to equation (12) gives











in terms of expectations of observable variables.





































































































t [t+1]  rmct
¶






t+1 + pt to obtain the third, and mct = rmct + pt to obtain the last line. Using















t [t+1]  rmct
!
(14)




8.2 The data sources
B e l o ww ed e s c r i b et h ed a t as o u r c e sa n dt h ed a t ad e ﬁ n i t i o n su s e di nt h ep a p e r :
Actual Inﬂation: is constructed using the quarterly nominal and real GDP (GNP prior to 1992)
from the Real Time Data-Set for Macroeconomists, quarters: 1968:4-2000:1, Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia http://www.phil.frb.org/. More details can be found in Croushore and Stark (2001).
Consumer Price Index: is the CPI for All Urban Consumer, as issued by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. This monthly series is seasonally adjusted and downloadable via ftp from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/time.series/cu/). Quarterly data are obtained by averaging
the monthly inﬂation rates of the considered quarter.
Expected Inﬂation: is constructed using the inﬂation rate implied by the quarterly forecast of
the implicit GDP price deﬂator (GNP price deﬂator prior to 1992) from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters and the actual value of the current implicit GDP deﬂator (GNP deﬂator prior to 1992),
quarters: 1968:4-2000:1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia http://www.phil.frb.org/.
Unit Labor Costs: are the log of the labor income share expressed in terms of deviation from
the sample average, where the labor income share is total compensation of employees divided by
nominal GDP. The latter series are obtained from the National Income and Products Accounts Tables
(Table 1.1 and Table 1.14, respectively), Quarters: 1968:4-2000:1, Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/.
Output: is constructed using the quarterly real GDP (GNP prior to 1992) series from the Real
Time Data-Set for Macroeconomists, quarters: 1968:4-2000:1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
http://www.phil.frb.org/. The series are Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered with smoothing parameter equal
to 1600.
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9 Figures and Tables
 
 





Solid line: expected inﬂation; dashed line: actual inﬂation.












Solid line: unit labor costs (the log of compensation of employees divided by GDP in deviation
from the sample mean); dashed line: Hodrick-Prescott (1600) ﬁltered output.




































Table 1: Biasedness of expectations
Constant 0.005
(0.001)**
Dummy (1968 : 4  1979 : 4) -0.016
(0.003)**




Note: The dependent variable is the inﬂation forecast error. In column two forecast errors are
regressed on a constant; in column three forecast errors are regressed on a constant and two
time dummies. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are reported in parentheses. One
(two) star(s) indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level.





Dummy (1968 : 4  1979 : 4) -0.016
(0.003)**
Dummy (1980 : 1  1989 : 4) 0.001
(0.002)
Observations 126 126
Note: The dependent variable is the inﬂation forecast error. The second column ﬁts an AR(1)
and reports the AR-coe!cient; the third column adds two time dummies; the forth column adds
a fourth-order moving average to capture potential seasonalities. Asymptotic standard errors




Table 3: Orthogonality tests
F-statistics
Output Inflation Unit Labor Costs CPI Inflation All
Lags 1-4 4.48 6.56 6.81 3.34 3.68
(0.0021) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0126) (0.0001)
Observations 122 122 122 122 122
R-squared 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.26
Lags 2-4 5.85 2.40 3.57 3.96 3.47
( 0.0009) (0.0715) (0.0163) (0.0099) (0.0002)
Observations 122 122 122 122 122
R-squared 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.19
Note: The inﬂation forecast error is regressed on lags 1 to 4 (top panel) and 2 to 4 (bottom
panel) of output, inﬂation, unit labor costs, CPI inﬂation, and on all of these variables in the
row named ’All’. The table reports F-statistics for the hypothesis that the coe!cients on all




Table 4: The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Unit Labor Costs Output
unrestricted q =1 unrestricted q =1
 0.990 1 1.018 1
(0.035)** - (0.041)** -
 0.098 0.096 0.055 0.055
(0.027)** (0.018)** (0.026)** (0.018)**
 0.735 0.734 0.785 0.791
(0.037)** (0.022)** (0.050)** (0.030)**
Observations 126 126 126 126
Note: The dependent variable is actual inﬂation. In the second and third column it is regressed
on expected inﬂation and unit labor costs, in the forth and ﬁfth column on expected inﬂation
and output. The coe!cients q and b denote the discount factor and the coe!cient attached to
marginal costs. In the third and ﬁfth column q is constrained to be equal to one. The value
of the stickiness parameter w is calculated using the point estimates of q and b.A s y m p t o t i c
Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are reported in parentheses. One (two) star(s) indicate
signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level.
Table 5: Sub-Sample Stability
Unit Labor Costs Output
  
1968:4-1979:4 1.0140 0.2097 0.6316 1.1512 0.0547 0.7361
(0.0524)** (0.0407)** (0.0367)** (0.0596)** (0.0210)* (0.0674)**
1980:1-1989:4 0.8541 0.0962 0.7774 0.8949 0.0170 0.9144
(0.0257)** (0.0425)* (0.0750)** (0.0484)** (0.0267) (0.0747)**
1990:1-2000:1 0.8627 0.0149 0.9297 0.8527 0.0792 0.8004
(0.0499)** (0.0311) (0.0774)** (0.0362)** (0.0573) (0.0459)**
Note: The coe!cients q, b and w denote the discount factor, the coe!cient attached to real
marginal costs, and the degree of price stickiness, respectively. Columns two to four use unit
labor costs while columns ﬁve to seven use detrended output. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags





Table 6: The Role of Lagged Variables
Unit Labor Costs Output
 0.445 1.153 0.990 0.376 1.089 1.015
(0.124)** (0.183)** (0.036)** (0.094)** (0.214)** (0.039)**
 0.050 0.097 0.120 0.042 0.053 0.009







Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125
Note: The dependent variable is actual inﬂation, which is regressed on expected inﬂation (q)
and marginal costs (b). In columns two to four (ﬁve to seven) marginal costs are given by unit
labor costs (detrended output). As additional regressors enter lagged inﬂation (columns two
and ﬁve), lagged expected inﬂation (columns three and six) and lagged marginal costs (columns
four and seven). Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are reported in parentheses.




Table 7: Lagged Inﬂation










Note: The dependent variable is actual inﬂation, which is regressed on expected inﬂation (q)
and real marginal costs (b), given by unit labor costs in the second column and detrended
output in the third column. As additional regressor enters orthogonalized inﬂation which are
the residuals obtained from regressing the time t inﬂation expectations on actual t31 inﬂation.
The value of the stickiness parameter w is calculated using the point estimates of q and b.
Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags standard errors are reported in parentheses. One (two) star(s)




Table 8: The Indexation Model
Unit Labor Costs Output
unrestricted 1 = 2 1 = 2 =0 .5 unrestricted 1 = 2 1 = 2 =0 .5
1 0.525 0.443 0.626 0.511
(0.123)** (0.029)** (0.099)** (0.026)**
2 0.347 0.364
(0.143)* (0.117)**
3 0.075 0.079 0.051 0.043 0.044 0.045
(0.023)** (0.024)** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.017)* (0.015)**
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001)* (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 125
F-tests 1 = 2 1 =0 .5 1 = 2 1 =0 .5
0.46 3.92 1.53 0.18
(0.4970) (0.0498) (0.2180) (0.6694)
 0.662 0.581
(0.419) (0.274)*
 0.774 0.673 0.727 0.878 0.744 0.742
(0.143)** (0.203)** (0.014)** (0.064)** (0.016)** (0.013)**
Note: The dependent variable is actual inﬂation, which is regressed on lagged inﬂation (1),
expected inﬂation (2), and real marginal costs (3), where the latter are given by unit labor
costs (detrended output) in columns two to four (ﬁve to seven). Columns two and ﬁve report
unrestricted estimates; columns three and six constrain 1 and 2 to be equal; columns four
and seven restrict 1 and 2 to be equal to 0.5. Successive F-tests for these restrictions with
p-values in parentheses are reported in the respective columns. The values of q and w reported
are the ones implied by the point estimates of 1, 2,a n d3. Asymptotic Newey-West 4 lags
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